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DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS
By PHELPS F DARBYO

This discussion concerning deficiency judgments relates only
to those arising out of real estate mortgage foreclosures.
Mention will be made of the rights and liabilities of mortgagors and of mortgagees and of purchasers of mortgaged
property. No complete collection of court decisions will be
attempted. A few leading decisions in Indiana and other
states will be cited.
Questions relating to deficiency judgments naturally have
arisen more frequently during the depression years, chiefly
because all sections of the country have experienced unprecedented fluctuations in real estate values. As to some of the
questions arising in deficiency judgment cases, the court
decisions in the various States are in serious conflict. The
comments here will be confined largely to the statutes and
decisions in Indiana. The Legislature of Indiana, during the
depression years, has not deemed it necessary to enact an
emergency moratorium statute such as was passed in nine or
ten other States. In the year 1931, the Indiana Legislature
changed the procedure for the foreclosure of real estate mortgages; and as a result no foreclosure sale can be had and
consequently no deficiency judgment can be computed until
more than thirteen-months after the filing of the foreclosure
complaint. The full one year period for redemption now
expires before the sheriff's sale. This change applies only as
to mortgages executed after June, 1931.
*Of the Evansville Bar.
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Our Indiana statute, since the Revision of 1852, has protected the maker of a mortgage against personal liability upon
any implied promise to pay the mortgage debt. The statute
of 1852 which is now Section 56-702, Burns 1933, provides"No mortgage shall be construed as implying a covenant for the
payment of the sum intended to be secured, " * * and where
there is no express covenant contained in the mortgage for such payment, and no bond or other separate instrument to secure such payment shall have been given, the remedies of the mortgagee shall be confined to the lands mentioned in the mortgage."
A similar section was incorporated in the 1881 Code.
Under the old common law, it was necessary to institute
separate actions to enforce a mortgage lien, one at law for
the judgment on the bond or note, one in chancery to foreclose the lien against the mortgaged premises. Since the Revision of 1852 the two remedies (one for a personal judgment and one for foreclosure) can be united in one action.
The statute as re-enacted in 1881 which is now Section 3-1814,
Burns 1933, provides"In rendering judgment of foreclosure, the court shall give personal
judgment against any party to the suit liable upon any agreement or
agreements for the payment of any sum or sums of money secured by
the mortgage, and shall order the mortgaged premises, or so mueh
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the mortgage and judgment and
costs of the action, to be first sold, before levy of execution upon other
property of the defendant."
WHEN PERSONAL JUDGMENT MAY BE RENDERED
AGAINST MORTGAGOR

It is clearly provided in the statute above quoted that, as
a part of the foreclosure proceeding, a personal judgment
may be taken against the mortgagor and also against any subsequent purchaser who assumes the mortgage debt. The personal judgment thus obtained frequently becomes a deficiency
judgment following the sale of the mortgaged real estate,
this by reason of the provision which the court must embrace

DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS

in the decree and order of sale that "the balance due on the
mortgage and costs which remain unsatisfied after the sale
of the mortgaged premises shall be levied on any property
of the mortgage-debtor." The execution thus issued to enforce the deficiency judgment forthwith becomes a lien on the
personal property of the mortgage debtor.
If the suit is only for a foreclosure of the mortgage, it is
settled that a mere recital that the mortgage is to secure the
unpaid part of the purchase money is not sufficient to create
a personal liability. The holder of the mortgage may, if he
chooses, first by separate action take a personal judgment
against the maker of the mortgage note and enforce it by
execution against the mortgagor's other property, without a
waiver of the mortgage lien. A prior personal judgment on
a mortgage note and partial enforcement thereon will not preclude a second personal judgment on the same mortgage note
in connection with the decree in foreclosure.
A suit for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage must
be brought in the county where the real estate is located. It
is essentially an action in rem. If the mortgagor or other
party liable for the mortgage debt is in court only by constructive service, the court has no power to render a personal
judgment or any judgment concerning the excess remaining
unpaid after a sheriff's sale. As said in Lipperd v. Edwards,

39 Ind. 165:
"A mere judgment of foreclosure, without any personal judgment,
after applying the proceeds of the sale, is exhausted by the sale of the
mortgaged premises, and cannot become the foundation of another

action, for the purpose of making the balance of the debt secured by
the mortgage.

It is merely a judgment in rem, and when the prop-

erty has been sold, the judgment has no more vitality."
If the mortgage or mortgage note provides for attorney's
fees, then this item becomes a part of the general judgment,
and in computing the amount which shall constitute the deficiency judgment (or judgment over) the total of the judgment consists of principal, interest, court costs and attorney's
fees.
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A personal judgment against the mortgagor can not be obtained in a foreclosure suit unless prayed for in the complaint.
The statute (Section 3-1814, Burns 1933) directs the court
to give personal judgment against any party to the suit who is
liable for the mortgage debt; and the statute also requires
the court to order the mortgaged premises to be sold first;
and the sheriff's sale must precede the levy of execution upon
other property of the defendant. A personal judgment can
not be rendered for any portion of the mortgage debt not due.
Therefore if the mortgage debt matures in several instalments, a so-called acceleration clause in the mortgage adds
to the practical value of the mortgage instrument.
If in a foreclosure proceeding, a personal judgment is rendered in favor of a junior mortgagee and the mortgaged real
estate is exhausted to satisfy the senior mortgage, execution
may issue forthwith against mortgagor's personal property
to satisfy the judgment in favor of the junior mortgagee.'
A purchaser who assumes the mortgage debt becomes as
to the mortgagor the principal debtor, and the mortgagor
becomes a surety; but the mortgagee, unless he has assented
to such an arrangement, may treat both as principal debtors,
2
and may have a personal judgment against both.
WHEN MORTGAGOR

Is

RELEASED FROM PERSONAL

LIABILITY

If the mortgaged real estate is sold and conveyed by the
mortgagor to one who assumes and agrees to pay the mortgage debt, and then the mortgagee subsequently releases the
grantee from personal liability without mortgagor's consent,
the legal effect of such release is to release also the mortgagor from all personal liability. Likewise if the holder of
the mortgage grants an extension of time to the purchaser
who has assumed the mortgage debt, and it is done without
mortgagor's consent, the holder of the mortgage thereby
releases the mortgagor from all personal liability.
1 Nix v. Williams, 110 -Ind. 234.
2Jones on Mortgages (8th Ed.), Sec. 920.
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If the purchaser of mortgaged real estate merely takes a
conveyance subject to the mortgage, then the relation is not
strictly one of principal and surety. The land itself stands in
the relation of a principal and is the primary source of payment, but there is no personal liability against the grantee.
There is a conflict of authority on the question of the effect
on the liability of the original mortgagor of an extension of
time granted by the holder of a mortgage to a purchaser of
mortgaged real estate who took subject to, but without assuming, the mortgage. In Maryland and New Jersey, it is
held that the rights of the mortgagee against the mortgagor
are not in any manner affected by such an extension. In California it is held that the mortgagor is released entirely. Our
Appellate Court of Indiana in a recent well-considered case
adopted what is undoubtedly the better rule and the one supported by the weight of authority; that where the grantee of
mortgaged real estate does not assume the mortgage, but
merely takes subject to it, the grantor occupies, to the extent
of the value of the land, the position of a surety; and if the
owner of the mortgage by a valid contract with the owner of
the real estate extends the time for the payment of the mortgage debt, the effect of such agreement is to release the
grantor and original mortgagor from liability to the extent
of the value of the mortgaged property at the time of the
extension. 3
An interesting phase of the question as to when a mortgagor is released arises when the mortgaged real estate has
been sold to one who assumes and agrees to pay the mortgage
debt, and at the grantee's request and without the mortgagor's
consent a portion of the real estate is released from the mortgage lien.
Under the English rule (followed by the Connecticut Supreme Court) there remains no personal liability against the
mortgagor. Almost all of the courts in other jurisdictions
hold that the English rule goes further than is necessary for
the protection of the mortgagor. The sound and reasonable
3 Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. Lindley

(1933),

97 Ind. App. 575,

358

INDIANA

LAW JOURNAL

rule seems to be that the personal liability of the mortgagor is
released to the extent only to which he is injured. One of the
leading cases 4 announced this latter rule and good reasons
supporting it as follows
"It is certainly the duty of the mortgagee not to release any security
which he may hold, if the mortgagor is thereby exposed to personal
liability for the debt secured, which he would not otherwise incur.
Where the mortgagor conveys the equity of redemption, upon the contract that the purchaser shall pay the mortgage debt, or under such
circumstances that the purchaser must pay it if he would protect his
property, the mortgagor has the right to have the mortgaged property
applied to its payment. If there are several parcels of land included
in one mortgage, the mortgagor cannot complain if the mortgagee
release one or more of them for the benefit of those who may own the
equities of redemption therein, if the mortgagee is satisfied to rest upon
the security thus diminished, but the mortgagor is entitled to complain,
if, having provided the mortgagee with sufficient security, such security
is released, if thereby a personal liability to pay the debt is permitted to
remain upon him, while the means which he has provided for meeting
it have been disposed of. But it is not easy to see why he has any
just ground of complaint beyond the extent to which he is thus injured.
* * * But he should not be further discharged than this, as he
thus receives full indemnity for all the injury he can sustain."
Bearing in.mind that our Indiana decisions clearly adhere

to the principle that when the grantee of mortgaged real estate expressly assumes and agrees to pay the mortgage debt,
the grantee becomes the principal debtor and the mortgagor
becomes his surety, it is easy to see that the rule stated in the
Massachusetts case, supra, is the correct rule in Indiana. In

the case of Southern Surety Company v. Merchants &c. Bank
(1931)

203 Ind. 173, the court at page 199 restates and ap-

surety is displies the well-established rule that, -"The
charged where collateral securities held by the creditor are
voluntarily returned without the consent of the surety, at least
to the value of such collateral securities." Applying this rule
which obtains in the principal-surety relationship to the set of
facts relating to the sale of mortgaged real estate, it seems to
be a sound conclusion to say that when an original mortgagor
4 Worchester Savings Bank v. Thayer, 136 Mass. 458.
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of real estate has conveyed the real estate to a third person
who assumes and agrees to pay the indebtedness secured by
the mortgage and then the mortgagee releases a part of the
real estate from the lien of the mortgage without the consent
of the original mortgagor, the effect on the personal liability
of the original mortgagor is that he is discharged from such
personal liability to the extent of his injury, that is, to the extent of the value of the land released from the mortgage lien.
With the coming of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Act a few courts which had formerly held that the mortgagor
was completely discharged from personal liability where the
mortgagee entered into a valid contract of extension of time
for the payment of the mortgage with the assuming grantee,
and without the mortgagor's consent, reversed their position
because of their interpretation of the provisions of Sections
119 and 120 of the Act. They did this upon the theory that
Section 119 of the Act provides five instances in which a
negotiable instrument is discharged and that the extension of
time for payment was not included. However, these decisions
are severely criticized by other courts which hold that Section
119 is not all inclusive but merely sets forth five additional
ways in which a negotiable instrument may be discharged.
This criticism is justified, particularly in view of the language
of Section 196 of the Uniform Act which provides that "in
any case not provided for in this Act the rules of the law merchant shall govern." By the law merchant a discharge of the
mortgagor from personal liability on the obligation is allowed
where there occurs a valid extension of time by the mortgagee
to the assuming grantee, where the mortgagee knows of the
assumption and the mortgagor does not consent thereto.
In the recent decision from our Indiana Appellate Court
which we have mentioned (Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co.
v. Lindley, 97 Ind. App. 575), the appellant contended that
the question of discharge from liability should be governed by
the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act and that the Section
119 of the Act provides the only methods by which appellee
(the mortgagor) could be discharged. Our court in commenting upon that contention does not refer to the significance of
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Section 196 but refused to consider the Negotiable Instruments Act as pertinent, saying,"This contention can not prevail where the facts are such as are
disclosed by the complaint herein, as the obligations and rights of the
parties are controlled by the principles of equity heretofore discussed
in this opinion, and not by the provisions of the act sought to be
invoked."
WHEN PERSONAL JUDGMENT MAY

BE RENDERED AGAINST

PURCHASER OF MORTGAGED REAL ESTATE

The acceptance of a deed which states that the conveyance
is subject to a mortgage held by a third party does not render
the grantee personally liable for the mortgage debt. It is
competent, however, to establish by evidence that a grantee
who has taken title subject to a mortgage is nevertheless personally liable for the payment of the mortgage debt. The personal liability may be established by proof of a collateral
agreement, verbal or written, which- the purchaser has made
with his vendor, the mortgagor. It is held proper to prove
such a collateral agreement, and particularly when the consideration recited in the deed is "one dollar and other valuable considerations."
The proof required to establish a collateral parol agreement to assume the mortgage debt must be clear and convincing. It is noted in this connection that by the strong
weight of authority the admission of this proof does not violate the parol evidence rule nor the statute of frauds. The
real consideration for a deed of conveyance may be shown by
parol evidence, although different from that stated in the
deed. 6
If the words used in the deed are such as to leave doubt as
to whether the grantee has assumed the mortgage debt, evidence is admissible to aid in construing the deed; and to that
end evidence may be introduced to show the value of the real
5 Enns-Halbe Co. v. Templeton (1931), 101 Fla. 601, 135 So. 135; Dickman
v. Wasler (1933), 114 N. J. Eq. 382, 168 A. 582; Clark v. Henderson (1932),
62 N. D. 503, 244 N. W 314.
6 Gregory v. Arms (1911), 48 Ind. App. 562, 574.
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estate, the real consideration, and what amount if any the
grantee has retained to pay the debt. If the purchaser of
mortgaged real estate as a part of the purchase consideration
has verbally promised the grantor to pay the mortgage debt,
and the grantor continues personally liable for the debt, it is
well settled that the holder of the mortgage can sue the
grantee to enforce the latter's personal liability and in that
event the grantee's promise is not within the Statue of frauds. 7
There is conflict of authority in the various jurisdictions as
to whether a grantee assuming a mortgage debt can be held
personally liable when the grantor is no longer personally liable. The Indiana rule is that the purchaser assuming the mortgage is personally liable regardless of whether his grantor is
personally liable or not, this being on the basis that the personal liability of the grantee depends upon his own contract,
and not upon the liability of his grantor."
Indiana is one of several States adhering positively to the
soundness of the principle known as the third party beneficiary
doctrine. However, in applying the rule, our Supreme Court
holds that a contract cannot be sued upon by a third person
unless the contract clearly evidences a distinct intention to
benefit such third person. 9
In view of the very strict test applying when the effort is
made to apply the third party beneficiary doctrine, it follows
that only in rare instances can it be shown that a purchaser
assumed a mortgage debt with intent to benefit primarily the
holder of the mortgage. The real estate deed is usually prepared by the grantor or by some one for him. The assumption covenant is usually inserted to relieve the grantor, so far
as possible, from his own personal liability. Consequently, in
actual experience it is seldom that the practitioner is called
upon to draft an assumption clause to evidence an intention to
primarily benefit the holder of the mortgage. The mere fact
7 Hauser v. George (1934), 100 Ind. App. 346; Harvey v. Lowry (1932),
204 Ind. 93, 97.
8 Birke v. Abbott, 103 Ind. 1.
9 Irwin's Bank v. Fletcher Trust Co., Receiver, 195 Ind. 669, 692; Reynolds
v. Louisville &c. Ry. Co., 143 Ind. 579, 629.

INDIAN,

LA IV JOURNAL

that the third party (holder of the mortgage) derives an incidental benefit from the performance of the promisor, does
not give the third party the right to sue upon the contract resulting when a purchaser of real estate has assumed an existing mortgage. 10
In view of the fact that it is so seldom that a deed conveying mortgaged real estate is so written as to show definitely a
purpose on the part of the purchaser to make his assumption
of the mortgage as a benefit expressly for the holder of the
mortgage, it follows that the practical method of determining
the purchaser's personal liability is to apply the equitable subrogation doctrine. This is to measure the rights of the parties
according to the principal-surety relationship of the parties.
When mortgaged real estate is being sold, the vendor who has
signed the mortgage and note generally wants his purchaser to
expressly assume the mortgage debt. In this manner, as
stated before, the purchaser becomes primarily liable as principal and the mortgagor only a surety for the payment of the
debt. The mortgaged property, however, as between them is
the primary fund for the payment of the debt. If the purchaser fails to pay the debt when it matures, the mortgagor
can himself pay it and then be subrogated to all the rights of
the mortgagee and may hold it and enforce it as against the
rights of the purchaser. If the real estate encumbered by the
mortgage is re-sold by the first purchaser or is acquired by
successive grantees, the same rights of subrogation are
granted by law to the party who pays the debt in discharge of
his personal obligation to do so. It is held, however, that
there is no personal liability against a remote grantor if there
has been a break in the continuous chain of the principal-surety
relation.-1
WHEN PURCHASER OF MORTGAGED PROPERTY

Is

RELEASED

FROM PERSONAL LIABILITY

If the mortgagee voluntarily discharge the mortgagor from
personal liability, his lien upon the mortgaged premises is not
10 Harvey v. Lowry, 204 Ind. 93, 101.
11 Harvey v. Lowry, 204- Ind. 93, 101.
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affected, nor does he discharge the mortgage as against a
subsequent grantee assuming the debt.
Such a release of personal liability is sometimes made when
the mortgagor has sold the real estate to another who has
assumed the payment of the debt, and the mortgagee is willing to look to the latter and the property for the satisfaction
of his claim. It is important of course to use words in the release indicating clearly that it is the personal liability only
which is being released. If the release is general in its terms
and without limitation it may be a complete discharge of the
mortgage debt.
As between the original parties, the release of a part of the
mortgaged real estate does not affect the mortgagee's lien
upon the residue. This is bound for the whole debt. But as
against others who have liens upon portions of the mortgaged
premises, a mortgagee with notice of such liens has no right to
release any portion of the.mortgaged real estate to the injury
of the owners of such liens. The release or transfer to the
mortgagee must take place at some time subsequent to the
execution of the mortgage and not contemporaneously therewith. The mortgagee in such a case occupies a position similar
to that of a purchaser at a foreclosure sale. Such a transaction
although binding between the parties, can not affect the rights
of a subsequent lien holder who has the privilege of redeeming. It is certainly always more advisable for a mortgagee to
acquire the mortgagor's interest by deed of conveyance rather
than by release. Some courts hold that the mortgagee can
not acquire a fee simple title except when it is conveyed by a
formal deed of conveyance and without any condition permitting redemption.
A question sometimes arises following a mortgage foreclosure as to whether the mortgagee can maintain an action
and recover judgment against the mortgagor for taxes or insurance previously advanced by the mortgagee to protect his
interest in the real estate. The authorities hold that such an
independent action can not be maintained. The rule is that
any such payment if enforceable at all against the real estate
must be collected only in connection with and because of the
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mortgage and can not be maintained against the mortgagor
independent of the mortgage. Pennsylvania holds to the contrary.
In Indiana our Appellate Court has held that the holder of
a sheriff's certificate of sale can not during the year of redemption pay the accruing taxes on the land sold at sheriff's
sale and thereby obtain a lien on the land for the amount of
2
the taxes paid.1

RECENT STATE STATUTES CONCERNING DEFICIENCY

JUDGMENTS

Throughout the States generally the recent moratorium
statutes have been either sustained or rejected, according to
the reasonableness of the particular statute in regard to the
period of extension granted. The principal case involving the
validity of such a statute is the Minnesota case decided by the
U. S. Supreme Court in January, 1934.13 One of the provisions of the Minnesota statute was that "no action shall be
maintained in this State for a deficiency judgment until the
period of redemption as allowed by existing law or as extended under the provisions of this Act, has expired." The
majority opinion by Chief Justice Hughes upholds the constitutionality of the statute upon five grounds-(1) An emergency existed in Minnesota which furnished a proper occasion for the exercise of the reserved power of the State to protect the vital interests of the community. (2) The legislation
was addressed to a legitimate end, not for the mere advantage
of particular individuals, but for the protection of a basic interest of society. (3) The mortgage was of unquestioned
validity and the relief afforded by the statute was justified by
the emergency and did not contravene the contract impairment
provision of the Constitution. (4) The equity of redemption
is the creature of equity and the legislation permits the courts
to alter or extend the statutory period of redemption within
reasonable limits and upon equitable terms; and the contract
clause is not an absolute and utterly unqualified restriction of
12

Government Building & Loan Institution v. Richards, 32 Ind. App. 24.

13 Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398.
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the State's protective powers. (5) The legislation is temporarily in operation and is definitely limited to the exigency
which called it forth; one provision of the statute being that
the extended period for redemption may be reduced if a
change in circumstances should develop.
Moratorium statutes in the several States in which they
have been enacted contain various provisions respecting deficiency judgments. Statutes of this nature have been upheld
in New York and Alabama upon the authority of the U. S. Supreme Court decision in the Minnesota case. Similar moratorium statutes have been held invalid in Arkansas, California,
New Jersey, Texas, Georgia and Arizona.
A statute in Arkansas provided that in foreclosure proceedings the mortgaged property should be considered to be of the
value of the loan, irrespective of the amount which might be
realized at the sale, thus in effect abolishing deficiency judgments. It was held to violate the obligations of pre-existing
14
mortgage contracts.
A statute in California limited recovery to the difference
between the amount of the debt and the fair market value of
the real estate at the time of the sale. The Act was declared
to be unconstitutional. 15
An Act of the same State precluding the right to a deficiency judgment on a mortgage obligation unless notice of
breach and an election to sell was recorded one year before
the sale was held invalid if retroactively applied. 16
An Act of New Jersey which provided for the deduction of
the fair market value from the debt, was invalidated as to preexisting contracts.'A later statute of New Jersey provided for similar relief
to mortgagors, but limited its operation to July 1, 1938, and
declared that a serious public emergency existed. Nevertheless it also was held to be invalid. 18
14 Adams v. Spillyards, 187 Ark. 641, 61 S. W (2d) 686, 86 A. L. R. 1492.
15 Bennett v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 5 Cal. App. (2d) 13,
42 P. (2d) 80.
16 Brown v. Ferdon, 5 Cal. App. (2d) 226, 42 P. (2d) 712.
17 Vanderbilt v. Brunton Piano Co., 111 N. J. Law 596, 169 A. 177, 89
A. L. R. 1080.
18 Sayre v. Duffy, 13 N. J. Misc. 458, 179 A. 459.
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A statute in Texas provided that where the mortgagor
could show that the property was sold on foreclosure for less
than its actual value there should be allowed on the deficiency
judgment a credit of the difference between the actual value
20
and the sale price. The court declared it unconstitutional.
Georgia enacted a law precluding the entry of a deficiency
judgment unless the foreclosure sale was confirmed on a finding that the property brought its true market value. As to
mortgages executed before its passage, the Act was held in21
valid.
An Act of Arizona took away the right to a deficiency judgment unless the mortgagee was able to prove that the value of
the property when the mortgage was executed was not in excess of the amount remaining due on the debt after the foreclosure sale, or that the depreciation in value was caused by
some act of the mortgagor; in other words, if he established
such proof he could recover a deficiency judgment for the
difference between the value of the property when the mortgage was given and the amount due on the debt. This Act
22
was declared unconstitutional.
In New York the Act provided for a stay of foreclosure
suits for about a year, conditioned on interest and taxes
being paid. It also provided for a deficiency judgment to be
fixed at the time of confirmation of the sale, allowing a credit
for the market value of the property as determined by the
23
court, or the sale price, whichever might be the higher.
IN CONCLUSION

During these recent years that have brought the enormous
increase in the number of mortgage foreclosures and in many
instances burdensome deficiency judgments, numerous and
varied ideas have been advanced to protect against misfortunes of this nature. The opinion by Chief Justice Hughes
in the Minnesota case establishes the validity of a moratorium
statute which is based solely upon the power of the legislature
20 Langever v. Miller, 124- Tex. 80, 76 S. W (2d) 1025, 96 A. L. R. 836.
21 Atlantic Loan Co. v. Peterson, 181 Ga. 266, 182 S. E. 15.
22 Kresos v. White, Supt. of Banks, Ariz. -, 54 P (2d) 800.
23 Klinke v. Samuels, 264 N. Y. 144, 190 N. E. 324.
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to afford relief of a temporary nature in an emergency period
of economic stress. The great importance of the principle involved in the Minnesota case was aptly stated by Justice
Sutherland at the outset of his dissenting opinion when he
said: "Few questions of greater moment than that just decided have been submitted for judicial inquiry during this
generation."
Aside from the legal phase of the deficiency judgment question and the constitutional question presented when the Legislature of a State undertakes to restrict or limit the right to
recover such a judgment, a suggestion now advanced by some
writers is that parties to a real estate mortgage transaction
should themselves in the instrument itself agree that the recovery in event of default be limited to the real estate security.
Parties of course have the right to enter voluntarily into such
a contract, but as a practical business matter this could hardly
be expected. The inevitable result, even if such an altruistic
plan could be widely adopted, would be the slowing down of
business transactions of this nature which in any manner depend upon real estate mortgage loans. There is little likelihood that many individuals and corporations engaged in the
business of loaning money on real estate security would feel
justified in agreeing to waive the right to enforce judgments
for deficiencies.
Our statutory procedure in Indiana relating to real estate
foreclosures is a model in some respects, but in the opinion of
the writer the statute could be improved by the addition of at
least one further protection to the mortgage-debtor. Inasmuch as the present 1931 statute provides that there shall be
no redemption after the foreclosure sale, it would be a reasonable safeguard to require a written report and confirmation
of every sheriff's sale in which the purchase price is less than
the total of the mortgage debt. This would give the debtor
one last opportunity to prevent a confirmation of the sale by
proving to the court's satisfaction inadequacy of price or other
sufficient reasons for disapproval of the sale. Such a change
would necessarily eliminate the present provision of the statute
requiring the foreclosure sale to be without relief from valua-
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tion or appraisement laws; and such a change in the statute
might perhaps have the effect of discouraging bidding at the
sale.
The purpose of this paper, however, is not so much to advocate this amendment of the statute as it is to suggest to
fellow practitioners the care that should be exercised in advising parties to a real estate mortgage transaction .of their
rights and liabilities, many of which are not usually well known
to the clients who participate.

